The Middle Ages, on the other hand, have no reputation for tolerance, the lack o f which is usually attributed to the influence of a powerful Church that w as able and willing to suppress all major deviations from the exclusive truth it w as convinced it possessed. Only the Reformation, it is often argued, forced the Church to change its attitude and to redefine its relation towards dissi dents.2 As a consequence, many historical studies of the idea o f tolerance begin on ly in the sixteenth century.3
He also equates tolerance with freedom o f religion. In his view, tolerance is intrinsically linked to the plurality and the relativity o f (religious) truth;8 wher ever such a plurality or relativity does not exist or is not acknowledged, Schreiner denies the existence o f "real" tolerance.
In my view the medieval concept of tolerance contradicts Schreiner's as sertions. Medieval tolerantia is a full-fledged example of what tolerance could be. It is an even more coherent and forceful concept than the rather loose notion o f tolerance in modem political discourse, precisely because it has nothing to do with religious freedom or the plurality of truth. As a matter o f fact the effort o f pluralizing (religious) truth in early modem thought went along with a seri ous setback o f medieval tolerance.
In order to substantiate these statements, I want to elucidate the medieval concept o f tolerance by discussing its use in medieval scholarly literature, par ticularly in canon law and scholasticism, from the twelfth century onward. Next, I want to point to some important differences with the allegedly "toler ant" tendencies in early modem thought, as exemplified by Erasmus. My find ings w ill finally permit me to advance some critical remarks about the notion o f "tolerance" in its current use.
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It is possible to distinguish three different meanings o f tolerantia in medi eval and early modem sources, meanings which originated in three different cultural contexts. In Antiquity, especially in stoic writings, tolerantia stood for the bearing o f anything which was a burden to the human body or, more often, to the human mind. Early Christendom developed a second meaning: tolerantia still indicated the bearing o f physical or psychological burdens, but with reli gious connotations. It referred to the virtuous capacity o f Christian individuals to endure with calm the many sufferings of earthly existence. In this sense, as a synonym o fpatientia, the term appears once in the New Testament (2 Cor. 1:6) and rather frequently in the writings o f the Church Fathers.9
In both its classical and its early Christian sense tolerantia refers to indi vidual life. It means the bearing o f difficulties which strike human beings per sonally. As a social and political concept, however, tolerantia is an invention of the Middle Ages. In medieval scholarly writing tolerantia came to denoteanalogously to some incidental examples in the works o f Augustine-the for bearance o f bad people (the immoral, the heterodox, the infidel) by those who had the power to dispose o f them. The object o f tolerance in this third sense were people and their allegedly bad habits, people who were seen as a burden to society and not, at least not primarily, to individuals. Moreover, the tolerat ing subject was no longer a powerless individual but a powerful collectivity that could destroy the tolerated people if it wanted to but ought not to do so. Tolerance thus came to imply the self-restraint o f political power, the absti nence from correctional or destructive force by the authorities governing soci The main social groups that profited from the tolerantia recommended in canon law seem to have been non-Christians, especially Jews, and prostitutes. The concept o f tolerantia was chiefly developed as an answer to the question of how ecclesiastical authorities should deal with the practices of Jewish relig ion,25 Jewish rites were considered an evil that had to be tolerated; the major evil that was thus prevented was the forced conversion of the Jews, for con version to Christianity had to be a matter of free will. Moreover, the Jews would be more willing to embrace the Christian faith, the canonists argued, when they were treated with benevolence.26 Accordingly, Joannes Andreae mentioned the Jewish rites as an example of acts that should meet with permissio tollens impedimentum: the Church should not only leave the rites unpunished but should also prevent others from disturbing them.27 The same arguments for tolerance applied to other unbelievers, notably to Muslims. Canon law mostly treated Jews and Muslims under the same headings, although canonists often took a harsher stance against the latter because, as a result of the crusades, Christianity was at war with them. The canonists agreed, however, that Mus lims w ho lived in peace with Christians ought not to be attacked or expelled. Other infidels living on the borders of Christendom (Prussians, Lithuanians) had to be treated analogously.28 The tolerance o f prostitution is less markedly expressed in canon law, yet prostitution was often mentioned as a sin that was rightfully allowed.29 Major evils that were thus prevented were, according to medieval authorities, adultery (with honorable women, that is), rape, and sod omy. 30 By the thirteenth century the concept of tolerance that had been elaborated in canon law was introduced into scholasticism, where its scope broadened considerably The schoolmen considered tolerance an attitude to be adopted not only by the Church but also by the state. Especially when they were defin- ing the relation of secular power to the Jews, the schoolmen eagerly took re course to the doctrine of tolerantia from canon law. The Summa theologica ascribed to Alexander of Hales (c. 1185-1245), for instance, contains an exten sive defense o f the tolerance of Jewish rites, with a large number of references to canonist writings.31 The work of Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) also offers good examples. Particularly illuminating is a passage from his Summa theologiae on the rites of the infidels. Thomas answered the question whether nonChristian cults should be tolerated by Christian rulers in the affirmative (with a reference to the Decretum Gratiani32). Those who are in power, Thomas ex plained, rightly permit certain evils lest some good be brought to nothing or greater evils take their place. Accordingly, prostitution is allowed by human government, because, as Augustine said, society would be devastated by unchec ked lust if prostitution were forbidden. So, although infidels may sin by their rites, they are to be tolerated if some good can be drawn from them or if some evil is avoided. Thus, the rites of the Jews should be tolerated, because they foreshadow the Christian faith, which is a good; for in this way we obtain testimony to our faith from our enemies. The rites of the other infidels, from which no good proceeds, can be tolerated so as to avoid scandal or hatred towards Christianity which could be the result of their suppression.33
Tolerance for the sake of the good that may result from the permitted evil seems to have been Thomas's own idea. This idea did not alter the fact that the tolerated evil remained as evil as it ever was. Thomas alleged that the Jews sin in their rites and he called them "our enemies." His argument shows that one did not have to like the Jews to be tolerant; to the contrary, one had to dislike them to be tolerant, for tolerance only applied to evil. Tolerance was not an imperative of love but a restraint on one's hatred. It is thanks to this restraint, however, that Jews, in the Thomistic concept, were permitted to live their own lives within the bonds of a Christian society.
If we turn to the small treatise on the government of Jews that Thomas wrote for the duchess of Brabant, we see the same line of argument. Thomas began with the statement that the Jews, because of their guilt for the crucifix ion, are destined to perpetual slavery and therefore could be treated as slaves by Christian rulers.34 Yet, Thomas argued, it is our duty to walk honestly towards them that are outside, as the apostle says (1 Thess. 4:12). Christian rulers should therefore behave correctly to their Jewish subjects and exact nothing more from them than is permitted by custom.35 Again, Thomas did not say that the ruler must embrace the Jews as if they were good subjects; in his vision, they remain sinful outsiders but precisely because they are outsiders, Christian rulers have to bear themselves honestly to them. Thomas even allowed for some room for the evil practice of usury with which the Jews were connected. Although the rulers would do better to compel the Jews to work, they were, in Thomas's view, entitled to levy taxes on the income their Jewish subjects drew from usury and to spend them for the common good. Thomas knew very well that usury was permitted by human law as a necessary tool to economic prosperity, although he never recommended the tolerance of usury in a direct way.36 In view o f the fact that Christian rulers tolerated Jews and other infidels chiefly because o f their utilitas,37 Thomas's qualified allowance for Jewish money lenders must have worked as a strong encouragement of the toleration of Jew s38 Arguments comparable to those of Thomas Aquinas can be found quite often in moralizing political literature of the later Middle Ages. Many authors made an appeal to the idea of tolerantia in order to demonstrate how to handle evil elements in a Christian society. They referred especially to the principle of opportunity, as in the case of Ptolemy of Lucca (c. 1236-c. 1327), who wrote a continuation of the speculum principis that his teacher Thomas Aquinas had composed for the king of Cyprus. According to Ptolemy, the evil of prostitu tion had to be tolerated because it prevented the greater evil of sodomy He falsely ascribed to Augustine the comparison between prostitution and the sewer of a palace: "Do away with the sewer, and you will fill the palace with stench; do away with the prostitutes, and you will fill the world with sodomy."39 Partly because it was believed that Augustine had really spoken these words and partly because it was believed that Thomas Aquinas himself had quoted Augustine in his speculum principis, this passage became an authoritative argument in favor of the toleration of prostitutes in the later Middle Ages. Not only did other writers refer to it in order to reinforce their own arguments, but so did the rulers of urban communities who had to defend the existence of maisons de tolérance within the limits o f their towns.40 Again, tolerance had nothing to do with ap proval. Prostitution was not allowed because it was considered a good but be cause its suppression would result in even greater evils.41
Apart from Jews and prostitutes, marginalized groups such as lepers, the insane, and beggars seem also to have benefited from the idea o f tolerance. In the later Middle Ages tolerantia had become an argument to justify the exist ence of all social deviance, especially in the urban community 42 This is not to say that medieval society was always tolerant in reality. Pogroms against the Jews and expulsions of marginal people as well as non-Christians did occur. But the theory of tolerantia was upheld by the popes, the canonists, and many authors influenced by them,43 and they served at least on a moral level as an impediment to blind destruction of what we nowadays would call "otherness." To be sure, this theory did not imply that worldly and ecclesiastical rulers had to take all evil for granted. Tolerance, it should be repeated, was extended to minor evils that were thought usefully left without interference. As Thomas Aquinas argued, human government should proceed against vitia graviora such as theft and murder but should leave lesser sins unpunished without approving of them, for one could not expect all citizens to be perfect. Minor evils could even be profitable to the state, and leaving room for them could consequently be an act o f wise statesmanship.44
Whether or not certain phenomena should be considered intolerable vitia graviora is of course open to debate. Neither Thomas nor the majority of his contemporaries did allow for heresy. In the very period which gave birth to the idea o f tolerance, Christianity became increasingly intolerant o f religious dis sent in practice as well as in theory. Even scholars who, with Richard Kieckhefer, combat the view of the Inquisition as a monolithic repressive agency directed by Rome, do not question the fact that "medieval churchmen from the twelfth century onward clearly did wish to exercise tighter control over the Church's members and to define more narrowly and precisely the boundaries o f permis sible belief and conduct."45
Another phenomenon that was generally considered intolerable was homo sexuality.46 Heretics and homosexuals were not even in theory allowed to dwell in the margins o f society, like Jews and prostitutes. Heresy and homosexuality were not seen as minor evils that society could afford. Heresy endangered the very core of Christian civilization, whereas homosexuality was felt to threaten the distinction between the sexes, the main distinction which Christian civiliza tion maintained within its own ranks. Tolerantia was a way of walking hon estly towards outsiders; towards insiders, strictness prevailed.
Unfortunately the latter difference is commonly disregarded in modem schol arship, which tends to take the marginalization and the extermination o f devi ant social groups as two facets of one and the same process of "exclusion."47 In its medieval context, however, marginalization is, paradoxically enough, a way o f incorporating deviant groups in society, albeit in its outer spheres.48 Only the extermination of deviant groups at the gallows or the stake can be accounted as real exclusion, as a way of getting rid of evil when tolerance was felt to be out o f place-as was the case with heretics, homosexuals, and ordinary criminals. For the total and final exclusion of evil, however, medieval Christians had to wait for the Last Judgment. During the saeculum, minor evils had to be sup ported and could even be used for the sake of the common good.
Early modem history offers a different picture in this respect. The process o f pluralizing religious truth seems indeed to have been initiated in the six teenth century. Especially before the beginning of the Reformation, the human ists, especially those who were active north of the Alps, advocated a moderate diversity within the sphere of Christian doctrine and practice, thus introducing a freedom that their medieval predecessors had been unwilling to concede. Authors such as Erasmus abhorred doctrinal disputes and were much more interested in restoring a true Christian piety, that could make itself felt in differ ent ways. It is not certain whether the relative freedom of religious thought and action envisaged in Christian humanism really left more room to the faithful in comparison to medieval practice, in which divergent opinions coexisted (after all, one o f the most frequent humanist reproofs to scholastic theologians was precisely that they never agreed with each other). Nevertheless, Erasmus and his fellow humanists defended at least the idea of the flexibility of Christian truth as a matter of principle.
It is the appeasing attitude of Erasmus in an age of growing religious polar ization which has inspired the notion of "Erasmian tolerance."49 This notion, however, is rather out of place. Erasmus never recommended his ideas on the matter in the name o f tolerance, as Mario Turchetti has argued.50 For Erasmus tolerantia was a choice for the lesser of two evils. Yet he did not consider the relative freedom of belief that he advocated as a lesser evil which would be better left without interference to prevent worse things, but rather as something normal and acceptable, so that the question of tolerance was irrelevant. What ever the merits of his views may have been, the term "tolerance" is not right. Reluctance in rejecting the opinions of others is not the same thing as tolerat ing opinions one actually rejects. In fact Erasmus recognized several forms of orthodoxy, which is quite different from allowing forms of heterodoxy It is precisely on behalf of the unity and the concordia among the Christians that he worked out the idea of a harmless religious diversity.51 Towards real heterodoxy, Erasmus was not usually indulgent. In his view opinions that could not be reconciled with the Christian faith as he conceived it (more amenable though he may have been compared with some contemporar ies) had to be suppressed if necessary even by the death penalty. O f course one had to try to cure heretics before inflicting capital punishment on them, but if no other remedies were effective, one had to cut off the heretical limbs from the social body in order to prevent the contamination of the whole community.52 W hen heresy went along with insurrections, the evildoers should even be put to death without hesitation,53 unless a major part o f society was afflicted; for a religious war would be a greater evil than the existence of heretics. This last line o f thought reminds one of the medieval tolerantia, although Erasmus added that the allowance of heresy should only be a provisional solution: with the passage o f time, society had to be purged from the monster of heresy as soon as the opportunity presented itself.54 In dealing with heretics, then, Erasmus was usually no less intransigent than medieval theologians.55 Only after his death did a generation o f Catholic as well as Protestant theologians elaborate the idea that the evil o f heresy should in principle be tolerated in case of political need, m ost notably when tolerance could prevent the maius malum o f a massacre among the citizens.56
There are, however, some important exceptions to Erasmus's lack of indul gence to heresy. In expounding the parable of the wheat and the tares from the gospel o f Matthew (13:24-30), Erasmus stated explicitly that, according to Christ, the mixture o f the wheat (good Christians) and the tares (bad Christians, in particular heretics) had to be tolerated until the conclusion of history, when 125: "Aussi bien leur idéal [of the Christian humanists] n'est pas tant la tolérance que la réduction des divergences religieuses par un loyal effort de conciliation." Accordingly, the term "tolerantia" is absent from sixteenth-century treaties on religious pacification like the Peace of Augsburg (1555), which employs the term "concordantia" (Schreiner, 447). God would separate the two at the Last Judgment.57 This view can be qualified as genuinely tolerant, and indeed as a departure from medieval rigidity. Still, when the Lutheran author Gerard Geldenhouwer published in 1529 a selection of Erasmus's statements in favor of the tolerance of heretics, Erasmus was upset. In his reaction to Geldenhouwer, Erasmus claimed never to have said that heretics should not be put to death, but only that one should not immedi ately draw the sword after any accusation of heresy whatsoever by any monk or theologian whatsoever, because charity demanded that one first try to help the fallen. As for the parable o f the wheat and the tares, Erasmus argued that not pulling out the tares only applied to the early Church and to the apostles who had no other sword than the word of God,58 but that it did not imply any re striction o f the power of worldly rulers who used real swords against heretics.59
Erasmus's overall position with regard to heresy, then, was rather tradi tional. But if he did not consistently plead for the extension of tolerance to the field of heresy, what attitude did he adopt toward medieval views of tolerance?
Although the term tolerantia occurs in Erasmus's work mostly in its clas sical and its biblical sense,60 some echoes of medieval tolerantia can be found as well, notably with regard to Jews,61 toleration for whom Erasmus seems to have taken for granted. Unlike some of his contemporaries, Erasmus never called for the expulsion of Jews or the use of violence against them. Neither did he take a firm stand against the acts of violence to which Jews fell victim in his age. Apparently the toleration of Jews did not interest Erasmus very much; all we can say is that at least he did not oppose himself to it. Nonetheless it is clear from his writings that he did not like the Jews. It would not even be impossible to charge Erasmus with antisemitism. But contrary to what some scholars think,62 this is not an argument against Erasmian tolerance. Tolerance applied only to evil; thus, if Erasmus had not considered the Jews evil in some respect, there would have been nothing for him to tolerate. Erasmus did not like the Jews, but he did not dispute their right of existence in Christian society either, and this is exactly what makes him tolerant (although his statements on the matter are rather weak in comparison to medieval tradition). Erasmus's dislike of the Jews is a prerequisite of his tolerance, not an impediment to it.
Towards marginal people other than Jews who in the medieval tradition m et with tolerance in theory and often in practice as well, Erasmus seems to have felt the need for toleration even less, and sometimes he explicitly pleaded against it. He does not seem to have favored the toleration of prostitutes63 (ac tually prostitution became forbidden throughout Europe during the course of the sixteenth century), and he expressed himself repeatedly against the tolera tion of beggars64 and of other people who, in his view, were useless and harm ful to society. As he put it in his Institutio principis christiani:
... [I]t is far better to ensure that no offences at all are committed than to punish them once they have been perpetrated. This will be achieved if the prince can destroy, if possible, or at least check and reduce any thing that he has noted as a likely source of criminal behaviour.... The vigilant prince will therefore ensure that he has as few idlers as pos sible among his subjects, either making them work or banishing them from the state.65
Here Erasmus defends the typical humanist idea that the prince, as an educator o f his people, should teach his subjects how to behave as good citizens and to abstain from evil. The statement that the prince should cut all social evil at the roots, rather than to let it grow in order to punish it, was a commonplace in Renaissance political writings. Contrary to medieval opinion, evil was not to be tolerated, neither in the center nor in the margins of Christian society. Illus trating his view with the same medical metaphor he used with regard to heresy, Erasmus stated that harmed parts of the social body had to be removed before they contaminated the whole, either by restoring them to health or by cutting them off.66 On no account could social evil be tolerated in its state of depravity. Not only were the traditional vitia graviora envisaged here, but so were all sorts of moral degradation, the effect of which was much harsher, in Erasmus's opinion, than state control of the citizens' conduct.67 Although it would be unfair to depict Erasmus, or the Christian humanists in general, as purely intole rant-we could point to several passages in Erasmus's work which deal less uncompromisingly with social evil68-one cannot overlook the tendencies in Renaissance political thought to strive against all evil elements in society and to exclude them rather than to incorporate them if this seemed to be opportune, as medieval authors had recommended.69
A major reason for Erasmus's uncompromising attitude to social evil seems to be his idea that only when one makes efforts to realize the ideal situation can one hope to bring forth an even modestly better state of affairs. In his commen tary to the adage "Grasp the summit, and halfway will be yours," Erasmus attacked the scholastics who debated the extent to which it was permissible to give in to evil, since it was better to combat evil in all its forms: only this would eventually lead to improvements of some sort.70 In his preface to the 1518 edition of the Enchiridion militis christiani we find the same argument. After having criticized the scholastics for never giving clear-cut directions for human conduct but indicating instead what was tolerabilis, Erasmus explained that the highest goal-Christ and his teaching in all its purity-"must be set before everyone, that at least we may achieve something half way."7' Thus Erasmus criticized the medieval tradition not for showing a lack o f tolerance but for having too much of it. Contenting oneself with the lesser of two evils was no serious option for him. As he put it in Antibarbari: "Something that is tolerated can even be pleasing when it is compared with something worse; but it will please a great deal more if it is changed into something better."72 Erasmus's willingness to continue the medieval tradition o f tolerance, then, is remarkably low. However, he made extensive use of the concept o f tolerantia in a field that has commonly been overlooked: his polemics against the Protes tants. Opposing himself to the radical break of Lutheranism from the medieval Church-a break which, according to Erasmus, was based on the idea that once w a new Church was founded, religion and morality would be safe-he frequently took recourse to the idea of tolerance. He insisted that it was nonsense to think that the new Church would be some holy community protected against decay. Evil, Erasmus argued, was intrinsic to earthly existence and thus had to be tolerated in any human institution. In his invective against the Lutheran Geldenhouwer he affirmed:
As long as the net of the Church is trailed through the course of earthly history and has not yet reached the shore, one should tolerate the mix ture o f good and evil; it has always been the case and will always be the case for the human condition that it yields more bitterness than honey. 73 If human faults were to be corrected at all, Erasmus continued, one should be careful only to remove the wrongs of the institution at stake, not the institution itself B ut the Protestants were anything but careful and destroyed everything. Turning the parable from Matthew against Geldenhouwer, Erasmus wrote: ^you people pull out the wheat with the tares, or, I should rather say, you pull out the wheat instead o f the tares."74 Tolerating the tares, then, was a better solution. As Erasmus stated in Hyperaspistes /, in which he attacked Luther directly: I know that in this church, which you call papist, there are many people who displease me: but I see such men in your church as well. However, evil to which one is used is tolerated more easily. I shall therefore tolerate this church until I shall see a better one.... He who holds the middle course between two different evils is not an unhappy naviga tor. 75 Here Erasmus adopts a tolerant attitude in the medieval sense of the term, allowing for the lesser evil of degenerated Catholicism to prevent the greater evil o f Protestant anarchy. Even a moderate tyranny o f superstition seemed
Is tv an Bejczy more tolerable to him than a total revolution.76 Superstitions that did not result in impiety should be tolerated, Erasmus declared, just as inept depictions in churches, failing monasteries and universities, and (as long as there was no alternative) scholastic theology.77 Once Erasmus even put the toleration of Jews and of medieval Catholicism on one line:
The Apostles showed toleration to the Jews, who could not be weaned away from their ingrained taste for the Law; and the same, I believe, they would rightly show to these men who for so many centuries have accepted the authority of all those councils and popes and distinguished teachers, and find some difficulty in swallowing the new wine of this modem teaching.78
Confronted, then, with the Protestant idea that one can and must create a perfect Christian society by turning away from the traditional Church, Erasmus abandoned his vision that one should always strive for perfection in order to make at least some improvements. He pleaded instead for tolerance of the Catho lic tradition, if necessary until the end of history. Thus the most cogent ex amples of Erasmian tolerance do not announce modernity but spring from a concern to preserve medieval Catholicism. Rather than developing a new idea o f tolerance as an instrument against the totalitarian aspirations of the medieval Church, Erasmus used the existing concept of tolerance to oppose the no less totalitarian assumption of Protestantism that it could realize, or that it even represented, the City of God on Earth.
My survey of medieval and humanist attitudes towards tolerance enables me to draw some critical conclusions. Contrary to Klaus Schreiner's statements, the pretension of the medieval Church to represent the absolute truth did not imply a limitation of the meaning of tolerance. It is in order to define its own attitude towards those who did not conform to the absolute truth that the Church developed and adopted the idea of tolerantia. Heretics (the enemies from within) were persecuted, but unbelievers, especially Jews (the enemies from without) were granted a right of existence, as were most social elements who offended the moral code which the absolute religious truth legitimized and sanctified. It is also evident that the close bonds between Church and state in the Middle Ages did not weaken the impact of tolerance but reinforced it. Ecclesiastical authors themselves advised worldly rulers to adopt a tolerant attitude towards evildoers, by taking recourse to the concept of tolerance in canon law and ap plying it in the secular sphere.
Schreiner's assumption that tolerance implies freedom o f religion and plu rality o f truth seems to me fundamentally mistaken. In the medieval tradition, tolerance is a precept of non-interference on the part of those who are in power. Once religious freedom is acknowledged, religion becomes politically neutral and hence offers no ground for interference or non-interference any longer.
Religious freedom and religious tolerantia are therefore logically incompat ible. Plurality o f truth, on the other hand, is compatible with tolerantia, but the two concepts do not require each other. Tolerance does not concern the truth but the untrue. Whether the truth in question is uniform or plural is irrelevant. History actually teaches us that medieval tolerance coexisted with a uniform truth, whereas the effort o f pluralizing religious truth in early modem times was accompanied by a decreasing willingness to tolerate social deviance.
If we put it in general terms, we could say that medieval tolerantia defines the attitude o f Christian civilization to its own counterpart. Within the range of Christian civilization a set of absolute rules prevails (hence the persecution o f heretics); tolerantia, however, offers the possibility of coming to terms with the outer world. It is a way of getting along with essential cultural differences between Christian society and its outsiders. The allegedly tolerant tendencies in Renaissance thought, on the other hand, define only the relations within Christian civilization. Erasmian concordia invites us to consider Christian civilization as composed of relative, pluriform rules. It offers no possibility, however, o f coming to terms with the outer world. In fact there is little room for such a world: harmless cultural differences are allowed among the insiders o f Christian society, but essential cultural differences should preferably disappear.
In contrast w ith tolerantia, concordia means reluctance in rejecting others, but not in suppressing the rejected other. It teaches us to accept some variation within the range of the civilized; tolerantia, on the other hand, teaches us to live with real differences. between tolerance" might be a heritage of enlightened philosophy. In the eighteenth century the distinction between tolerare and approbare from canon law was no longer maintained.79 When Voltaire pleaded for "tolerance" in religious affairs, what he had in m ind was the peaceful coexistence o f different systems o f belief which, to him, had no real significance anyway. "Tolerance" thus came to mean little more than "indifference." This rather feeble notion o f "tolerance" still dominates in modem political discourse. When nowadays people urge the poli ticians (or politicians urge the people) to be tolerant, what they really have in 79 Schreiner, 533 384 Istvan Bejczy view is an indifferent attitude. Admitting the relativity of our truths, we should be reluctant to condemn the acts or beliefs of our fellow human beings that differ from our own-that is the basic idea o f our so-called tolerance. An idea that makes us morally defenseless if outright evil shows up; an idea, moreover, that should make us pray never to find the absolute truth again, for that would apparently imply the end o f tolerance.
From the medieval tradition o f tolerance we could learn that these last impressions are wrong. Medieval authors never doubted that they possessed the absolute truth, but they developed the concept of tolerantia as a way of getting along with the untrue. Medieval authors were never morally defense less against outright evil and condemned it wherever they believed to find it, but still they advocated not to interfere with it if this seemed to be opportune. Obviously we do not have the same enemies as medieval people. Still, with regard to the question o f how to handle the enemies we do have without going to the extremes of tyranny and inertia, the medieval doctrine of tolerance con tains a lesson for our age as well.
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